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VEHICLE CHECKPOINTS: THE EVER-EXPANDING ARRAY 
OF PURPOSES FOR WHICH A VEHICLE MAY BE STOPPPED  
 
SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK 
APPELLATE DIVISION, FOURTH DEPARTMENT  
People v. Gavenda1 
(decided October 7, 2011) 
 
This case concerns the conviction of an intoxicated driver 
who was stopped at a sobriety checkpoint.  The appellant, Donald 
Gavenda appealed his conviction of felony driving while intoxicated 
under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192[3]2 and § 1193[1][c].3  The 
appellant contended that the DWI checkpoint at which he was 
stopped and arrested “constituted an unreasonable seizure in violation 
of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution4 and ar-
ticle I, section 12 of the New York Constitution.”5  The Appellate 
Division, Fourth Department, held that the trial court properly deter-
mined that the checkpoint in question was a constitutionally permiss-
ible seizure.6  The court also found that the appellant‟s “vehicle was 
 
1 930 N.Y.S.2d 393 (App. Div. 4th Dep‟t 2011). 
2 N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1192(3) (McKinney 2009) (“Driving while intoxicated.  No 
person shall operate a motor vehicle while in an intoxicated condition.”). 
3 N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1193(1)(c) (McKinney 2009) (“Felony offenses. (i) A person 
who operates a vehicle (A) in violation of subdivision . . . three . . . of section eleven hun-
dred ninety-two of this article after having been convicted of a violation of subdivision two, 
two-a, three, four or four-a of such section . . . within the preceding ten years . . . shall be 
guilty of a class E felony, and shall be punished by a fine of not less than one thousand dol-
lars nor more than five thousand dollars or by a period of imprisonment as provided in the 
penal law, or by both such fine and imprisonment.”). 
4 The Fourth Amendment provides, in pertinent part: “The right of the people to be secure 
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated. . . .”  U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
5 Gavenda, 930 N.Y.S.2d at 393.  The New York Constitution reads, in pertinent part: 
“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against un-
reasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated. . . .”  N.Y. CONST. art. I § 12. 
6 Gavenda, 930 N.Y.S.2d at 393. 
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stopped „pursuant to a nonarbitrary, nondiscriminatory and uniform 
procedure, involving the stop of all vehicles‟ approaching the road-
block,” and that “all of the police personnel involved were given ex-
plicit verbal instructions on the procedures to be used at the road-
block, including the nature of the questions to be asked . . . and those 
instructions „afforded little discretion to [the] personnel.‟ ”7  As such, 
the court unanimously affirmed the trial court‟s judgment.8 
This case note examines the law as it relates to vehicular stops 
made by law enforcement, with particular focus on vehicle check-
point stops.  Close attention is paid to the types of checkpoints that 
have been upheld, the specific law enforcement goals for which 
checkpoint stops may be operated, as well as the Fourth Amendment 
implications raised by vehicle checkpoint stops. 
I.  GENERAL FOURTH AMENDMENT IMPLICATIONS 
The analysis of the legality of roadblocks and vehicle check-
points must start with the associated Fourth Amendment implica-
tions.  The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable 
searches and seizures.9  According to the Supreme Court, seizure in a 
vehicle context, for Fourth Amendment purposes, occurs at the mo-
ment when the vehicle is stopped at a roadblock or checkpoint.10  At 
that point, the driver and other occupants of the vehicle are no longer 
free to move about at their will, thus constituting a seizure under the 
Fourth Amendment.11  The fact that the seizure is only temporary, the 
purpose of it is limited, and the duration of the resulting detention is 
very brief–sometimes only a few seconds–does not alter the resulting 
impact on Fourth Amendment protections.12 
The Fourth Amendment does not protect against all searches 
and seizures, only those that are unreasonable.  “The essential pur-
 
7 Id. at 393-94 (quoting People v. John BB., 438 N.E.2d 864, 867 (N.Y. 1982); People v. 
Scott, 473 N.E.2d 1, 4 (N.Y. 1984)). 
8 Id. at 394. 
9 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  While the Fourth Amendment only protects against actions of 
the Federal Government, it was incorporated to the States through the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949) overruled on 
other grounds by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961). 
10 Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 450 (1990). 
11 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968). 
12 Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979). 
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pose of the proscriptions in the Fourth Amendment is to impose a 
standard of „reasonableness‟ upon the exercise of discretion by gov-
ernment officials, including law enforcement agents, in order to safe-
guard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary inva-
sions. . . .”13  As such, motorists have only a diminished “expectation 
of privacy in an automobile . . . ,” not an absolute right.14  Individua-
lized suspicion is not a prerequisite to a constitutional seizure of an 
automobile which is “carried out pursuant to a plan embodying expli-
cit, neutral limitations on the conduct of individual officers.”15  While 
the procurement of a warrant prior to a search or seizure is the pre-
ferred course of action, the Supreme Court has recognized certain 
“flexible, common-sense exceptions to this requirement.”16  Those 
include exigent circumstances,17 the search of a person and the sur-
rounding area–including the glove box of a vehicle18–incident to an 
arrest,19 following a hot pursuit,20 searches at the international border 
or its functional equivalent,21 and, logically, with consent of the party 
to be searched.22  There are other permissible intrusions that are “less 
severe than full-scale searches or seizures,” which also do not require 
a warrant.23  Those include a “stop and frisk,”24 a seizure for ques-
tioning,25 or at a roadblock or checkpoint.26 
Once the vehicle has been stopped at a roadblock or check-
point, the police still do not have unlimited authority to search or se-
 
13 Id. at 653-54 (quoting Marshal v. Barlow‟s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 312 (1978) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
14 United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561 (1976). 
15 Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979). 
16 Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 735 (1983). 
17 Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14-15 (1948). 
18 New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1982) (“ „Container‟ here denotes any object 
capable of holding another object.  It thus includes closed or open glove compartments, con-
soles, or other receptacles located anywhere within the passenger compartment, as well as 
luggage, boxes, bags, clothing, and the like.  Our holding encompasses only the interior of 
the passenger compartment of an automobile and does not encompass the trunk.”).  Id. at n.4. 
19 United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973). 
20 Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 289-99 (1967). 
21 Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272 (1973) (quoting Carroll v. United 
States, 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925)). 
22 Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624, 630 (1946). 
23 Brown, 460 U.S. at 736. 
24 Terry, 392 U.S. at 12, 30-31. 
25 United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881-82 (1975). 
26 Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663. 
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ize the content of the vehicle.  The plain view doctrine, which “per-
mits the warrantless seizure by [the] police of private possessions,” 
applies to such searches.27  This doctrine has three requirements:28 
First, the police officer must lawfully make an “initial 
intrusion” or otherwise properly be in a position from 
which he can view a particular area.  Second, the of-
ficer must discover incriminating evidence “inadver-
tently,” which is to say, he may not “know in advance 
of the location of [certain] evidence and intend to se-
ize it,” relying on the plain view doctrine only as a 
pretext.  Finally, it must be “immediately apparent” to 
the police that the items they observe may be evidence 
of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to sei-
zure.29 
Under this doctrine, the police may seize, without a warrant, any 
weapons or contraband that are in plain view of the officers.30  An ar-
ticle is also considered to be in plain view if it is visible to the police 
while shining a searchlight into a vehicle.31 
II. THE LAW RELATING TO AUTOMOBILE STOPS 
a.  Federal 
The Supreme Court held that the three-part test to determine 
the reasonableness of the seizure of a person which does not amount 
to a traditional arrest also applies to vehicular stops at roadblocks.32  
That test involves “a weighing of [1] the gravity of the public con-
cerns served by the seizure, [2] the degree to which the seizure ad-
vances the public interest, and [3] the severity of the interference with 
 
27 Brown, 460 U.S. at 736-37. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. at 737 (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465-66, 470 (1971)). 
30 Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586-87 (1980). 
31 Brown, 460 U.S. at 739-40 (finding that police seizure of party balloon containing illicit 
substance that was observed in plain view while shining a searchlight into the vehicle at a 
traffic stop, even when the officer changed his position to get a better view, is not an unrea-
sonable seizure). 
32 Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663. 
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individual liberty.”33  The test aims to strike “a balance between the 
public interest and the individual‟s right to personal security free 
from arbitrary interference by law officers.”34  The first part of the 
test establishes the need for the seizure; the second part evaluates the 
effectiveness of the seizure in achieving the goal established in part 
one; and the third part, the intrusion or interference with individual 
liberty, is evaluated for both the objective intrusion, “the stop itself, 
the questioning, and the visual inspection,” and subjective intrusion, 
“the generating of concern or even fright on the part of lawful travel-
ers. . . .”35 
1.  Roving Traffic Stops 
In Delaware v. Prouse,36 the Supreme Court held that roving 
traffic stops for which the police officer has no reasonable suspicion 
of a violation will itself violate the driver‟s Fourth Amendment pro-
tections.37  While the purpose of the stop–to ascertain that the driver 
of the vehicle has a valid license, that the vehicle itself is licensed and 
has passed the necessary safety inspections, and is otherwise not in 
violation of the Vehicle and Traffic Laws–would be permissible if the 
police officer had some objective fact to constitute individualized 
reasonable suspicion, the absence of such reasonable suspicion rend-
ers the stop gratuitous, and as such, violative of the Fourth Amend-
ment.38  The Court also suggested that if the police were to develop 
other methods for conducting those checks that “involve less intru-
sion or that do not involve the unconstrained exercise of discretion 
[such as the] [q]uestioning of all oncoming traffic at roadblock-type 
stops . . .” that would not violate the Fourth Amendment, even if the 
officers have no suspicion of a particular violation.39 
 
33 Brown, 443 U.S. at 50-51.  These three factors are commonly referred to as (1) the pub-
lic interest advanced, (2) the effectiveness of the program, and (3) the level of intrusion. 
34 Id. at 50 (quoting Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109 (1977)). 
35 Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 558. 
36 440 U.S. 648 (1979). 
37 Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663. 
38 Id.  In a prior case the Court held that the level of suspicion required to perform a rov-
ing traffic stop need not rise to the level of probable cause, which is certainly sufficient to 
perform such a stop.  See Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 884.  With this holding, the Court also 
established the minimum level of suspicion necessary to perform such a stop.  See Prouse, 
440 U.S. at 663. 
39 Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663. 
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2.  Permanent Immigration Checkpoints 
In United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,40 the Supreme Court 
upheld the usage of a permanent roadblock on a major highway less 
than 100 miles from the Mexican border with the purpose of inter-
cepting and apprehending undocumented aliens.41  In contrast to a 
prior decision which held unconstitutional a roving patrol stop to 
search for undocumented aliens,42 the Court here held that a perma-
nent checkpoint, set up on a major highway running from the border 
to the interior, is constitutional, and its operators do not require indi-
vidualized reasonable suspicion to stop vehicles passing through the 
checkpoint.43  The operators of such checkpoints do not need prior 
authorization by a warrant to briefly question motorists passing 
through the checkpoint.44  However, if the operators want to search a 
vehicle passing through the checkpoint beyond the scope of the plain-
view doctrine, probable cause is required.45 
3.  Non-Permanent Sobriety Checkpoints 
The Supreme Court first took up the issue of sobriety check-
points in Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz.46  In that case, 
the Court found that “the State has „a grave and legitimate‟ interest in 
curbing drunken driving . . .”47 and that “the weight bearing on the 
other scale–the measure of the intrusion on motorists stopped briefly 
at sobriety checkpoints–is slight.”48  As to the degree of subjective 
 
40 428 U.S. 543 (1976). 
41 Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 566. 
42 Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 273 (stating that simply being in the general vicinity of 
the border does not permit roving patrol stops of vehicles to search for illegal aliens.  Law 
enforcement or immigration enforcement officers require individualized reasonable suspi-
cion to make a roving patrol stop of a vehicle traveling on public roads, which is the same 
rule that applies to a stop that occurred in the interior – the proximity of the border is irrele-
vant to roving patrol stops).  The difference being that a roving patrol stop requires individu-
alized reasonable suspicion, but a checkpoint stop, at which all vehicles are stopped, can be 
operated without individualized reasonable suspicion as to the vehicles being stopped. 
43 Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 562. 
44 Id. at 566. 
45 Id. at 567. 
46 496 U.S. 444 (1990). 
47 Sitz, 496 U.S. at 449 (quoting Sitz v. Dep‟t of State Police, 429 N.W.2d 180, 183 
(Mich. Ct. App. 1988)). 
48 Id. at 451. 
6
Touro Law Review, Vol. 28 [2012], No. 3, Art. 20
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol28/iss3/20
  
2012] VEHICLE CHECKPOINTS 813 
intrusion, and the fear and surprise generated thereby, the Court noted 
that “[t]he „fear and surprise‟ to be considered are not the natural fear 
of one who has been drinking over the prospect of being stopped at a 
sobriety checkpoint but, rather, the fear and surprise engendered in 
law-abiding motorists by the nature of the stop.”49 
[T]he circumstances surrounding a checkpoint stop 
and search are far less intrusive than those attending a 
roving-patrol stop.  Roving patrols often operate at 
night on seldom-traveled roads, and their approach 
may frighten motorists.  At traffic checkpoints the mo-
torist can see that other vehicles are being stopped, he 
can see visible signs of the officers‟ authority, and he 
is much less likely to be frightened or annoyed by the 
intrusion.50 
The Court also found that the effectiveness of sobriety checkpoints in 
apprehending drunk drivers was sufficient, and at least as effective51 
as, if not more than, the Martinez-Fuerte checkpoints for illegal 
aliens.52  As such, the Court upheld the sobriety checkpoints as com-
pliant with the Fourth Amendment.53 
4.  Drug Interception Checkpoints and the 
Primary Purpose Rule 
In City of Indianapolis v. Edmond,54 the Supreme Court held 
that a roadblock with the primary purpose of “uncover[ing] evidence 
of ordinary criminal wrongdoing” contravenes the Fourth Amend-
ment.55  There, the City of Indianapolis set up checkpoints to inter-
 
49 Id. at 452. 
50 Id. at 453 (quoting United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 894-95 (1975)). 
51 Id. at 455.  The number of drunken drivers arrested at the Sitz checkpoint, as a percen-
tage of the total number of drivers passing through that checkpoint, was approximately 1.6 
percent.  By comparison, the number of undocumented aliens detected at the Martinez-
Fuerte checkpoints, as a percentage of the total number of vehicles passing through that 
checkpoint, was approximately 0.5 percent.  Thus, the Sitz sobriety checkpoint was at least 
as effective as, if not more than, the Martinez-Fuerte checkpoint, which the Court had pre-
viously held was sufficient to satisfy the effectiveness part of the Brown v. Texas test. 
52 Sitz, 496 U.S. at 455. 
53 Id. 
54 531 U.S. 32 (2000). 
55 Id. at 41-42. 
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cept illegal narcotics.56  In addition to checking driver‟s licenses and 
vehicle registrations, “a narcotics-detection dog walks around the 
outside of each stopped vehicle” to sniff for illegal drugs.57  The 
Court held that while the public interest in intercepting illegal narcot-
ics is substantial, and the intrusion caused by the vehicle being 
stopped at the checkpoint is minimal, “the gravity of the threat [of il-
legal narcotics] alone cannot be dispositive of questions concerning 
what means law enforcement officers may employ to pursue a given 
purpose.”58 
The Court cautioned that the inquiry to establish the primary 
purpose of the checkpoint should “be conducted only at the pro-
grammatic level and is not an invitation to probe the minds of indi-
vidual officers acting at the scene.”59  The subjective intent of the of-
ficer making the stop is irrelevant to its Fourth Amendment validity if 
the stop is justified objectively by probable cause to believe that a 
traffic violation has occurred.60 
The Court also declined “to suspend the usual requirement of 
individualized suspicion where the police seek to employ a check-
point primarily for the ordinary enterprise of investigating crimes.”61  
“[S]tops justified only by the generalized and ever-present possibility 
that interrogation and inspection may reveal that any given motorist 
has committed some crime” is not an interest sufficient to overcome 
Fourth Amendment protections.62  “When law enforcement authori-
ties pursue primarily general crime control purposes at              
checkpoints . . . [such] stops can only be justified by some quantum 
of individualized suspicion.”63 
5.  Information Gathering Checkpoints 
In Illinois v. Lidster,64 the Court upheld a checkpoint estab-
lished on a public road for the purpose of gathering information re-
 
56 Id. at 35. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. at 42. 
59 Edmond, 531 U.S. at 48. 
60 Id. at 45. 
61 Id. at 44. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. at 47. 
64 540 U.S. 419 (2004). 
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garding a crime that had occurred on that road one week prior, to 
which motorists using that road could likely have knowledge of.65  
The Court found that the purpose of the checkpoint in question was 
for a “special law enforcement concern[]” as opposed to the “general 
interest in crime control,” the latter of which the Court held violative 
of the Fourth Amendment in Edmond.66  Due to the fact that such in-
formation-seeking stops do not have a tendency to intrude on, or pro-
voke anxiety in, the motorist, and because “[t]he police are not likely 
to ask questions designed to elicit self-incriminating information,” 
such stops do not warrant the application of the Edmond-type primary 
purpose rule, and do not violate the Fourth Amendment.67 
b.  New York 
The New York test for analyzing the constitutionality of a 
roadblock or vehicle checkpoint, adopted in People v. Ingle,68 is 
much the same as the federal test.69  The test calls for a “balancing of 
the State and individual interests involved.”70  “[T]he State has a vital 
and compelling interest in safety on the public highways . . . [and] 
non-compliance with licensing and registration requirements, as well 
as many equipment violations, are not effectively detectable or deter-
rable without some form of on-the-spot inspection procedure.”71  Mo-
torists also have a “general right to be free from arbitrary State intru-
sion on [their] freedom of movement even in an automobile.”72  In 
addition to this balancing test, the court required that, in the absence 
of reasonable suspicion, where the police want to set up a roadblock 
or checkpoint, it must be done according to some general program-
matic scheme that is uniform, non-arbitrary, non-discriminatory, and 
leaves little discretion with the operating personnel.73 
Much like the Supreme Court decision in Prouse, the New 
York Court of Appeals four years earlier held, in Ingle, that arbitrary 
 
65 Id. at 422, 428. 
66 Id. at 424. 
67 Id. at 425-26. 
68 330 N.E.2d 39 (N.Y. 1975). 




73 Ingle, 330 N.E.2d at 41. 
9
Lucas: Vehicle Checkpoints
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2012
  
816 TOURO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28 
or gratuitous stops of motorists for routine checks are violative of the 
Fourth Amendment if they are made without reasonable suspicion.74  
The court held that where the police want to conduct routine checks 
of automobiles, be it for licensing or inspection purposes, there must 
either be some reasonable suspicion that a particular motorist, se-
lected at random, is in violation of the Vehicle and Traffic Law, or 
the check must be conducted as part of a routine, non-arbitrary, sys-
tematic procedure.75  The latter may be done randomly, but if so, “by 
some system or uniform procedure, and not gratuitously or by indivi-
dually discriminatory selection.”76  The court suggested that doing a 
“uniform inspection of all vehicles at a roadblock or checkpoint” 
would be permissible.77 
It is assumed that any other kind of stopping without 
cause or reason or by arbitrary caprice or curiosity is 
an impermissible intrusion on the freedom of move-
ment.  The difficulty is the separation of the permissi-
ble from the impermissible without unduly frustrating 
legitimate police purposes or encroaching unduly on 
the rights of individuals even as motorists.78 
1.  Roving Roadblocks 
Similarly, in People v. John BB.,79 the Court of Appeals 
upheld a roving roadblock when applied uniformly.80  In that case, 
there had been a series of burglaries in a sparsely populated area.81  In 
response, the police established a roving roadblock in which officers 
on patrol would stop all vehicles found driving in the area.82  The 
court found that the stops were not arbitrary due to the sparsely popu-
lated nature of the location and the numerous burglaries that had oc-
curred in the area, and was conducted according to a uniform proce-
 
74 Id. at 40-41, 44. 
75 Id. at 41. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
78 Ingle, 330 N.E.2d at 41. 
79 438 N.E.2d 864 (N.Y. 1982). 
80 Id. at 867.  This holding was limited to the circumstances of the case, “a sparsely popu-
lated area in which there has been a recent series of burglaries.”  Id. 
81 Id. at 866. 
82 Id. 
10
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dure.83  The court also found that the State‟s interest in acquiring in-
formation regarding the burglaries outweighed the individual‟s inter-
est to be free from inquisitorial interference by the police.84  As such, 
the roving roadblock did not violate the Fourth Amendment.85 
2.  Temporary Checkpoints 
In People v. Scott,86 the Court of Appeals upheld a temporary 
sobriety checkpoint that was set up for roughly twenty minutes at a 
time before moving to a different location, during a time of night 
when there was a high number of drunk drivers on the road.87  With 
the constitutionality of sobriety checkpoints clearly established, the 
court turned to the issue of whether the plan under which the check-
points were conducted complied with the Fourth Amendment.88  The 
court held that “[t]he fact that the plan contemplated situations in 
which not every car would be stopped did not affect its validity in 
view of the specific non-discriminatory pattern of selection it called 
for, and of the reasonableness of allowing some cars to pass when 
traffic became congested.”89  The court also held that the check-
point‟s purpose of being a deterrent to drunken driving did not inva-
lidate its constitutionality.90  Nor did its shifting after short periods of 
time in order to not have its location established and drunken drivers 
simply avoiding it.91 
 
83 John BB., 438 N.E.2d at 867. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. 
86 473 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 1984). 
87 Id. at 3, 6.  While most, if not all, sobriety checkpoints are innately temporary by their 
nature, as compared to the permanent checkpoints that were upheld in Martinez-Fuerte, the 
checkpoints considered in Scott shifted location multiple times on a single night of operation.  
This is different from the sobriety checkpoints the Supreme Court upheld in Sitz, six years 
after Scott was decided, which remained in the same location for the entire time of their op-
eration. 
88 Id. at 4. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. 
91 Scott, 473 N.E.2d at 4. 
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3.  Checkpoints Without a Stated Primary 
Purpose 
In People v. Jackson,92 the Court of Appeals held that a 
checkpoint that was set up for an array of non-prioritized purposes, 
most of which were general crime control purposes, did not meet the 
Edmond primary purpose requirements, and as such, violated the 
Fourth Amendment.93  The court in Jackson interpreted Edmond as “a 
refinement of the grave public interest/concern prong of the Brown v. 
Texas94 balancing process.”95  Edmond requires the court to “consider 
the nature of the interests threatened and their connection to the par-
ticular law enforcement practices at issue . . . [and to] look more 
closely at the nature of the public interests that such a regime is de-
signed principally to serve.”96  The Court of Appeals further noted 
that 
the People have the burden of establishing that the 
primary programmatic objective (not the subjective 
intent of the participating officers) for initiating a sus-
picionless vehicle stop procedure was not merely to 
further general crime control.  The Court [in Edmond] 
did not undertake comprehensively to delineate the 
kinds of particularized governmental interests for 
which suspicionless stops could be utilized.  The 
Court noted that they could encompass “a smaller 
class of offenses . . . [where] society [is] confronted 
with [a] type of immediate, vehicle-bound threat to 
life and limb.”  Furthermore, the Court held that a qua-
lifying secondary purpose of the police in setting up a 
roadblock would not serve to validate suspicionless 
stops primarily motivated by general crime control 
ends.97 
As such, the court held that without a specifically identified primary 
purpose “addressing some „type of immediate, vehicle-bound threat 
 
92 782 N.E.2d 67 (N.Y. 2002). 
93 Jackson, 782 N.E.2d at 71. 
94 443 U.S. 47 (1979). 
95 Jackson, 782 N.E.2d at 70. 
96 Id. (quoting Edmond, 531 U.S. at 42-43) (emphasis in original). 
97 Id. at 71 (quoting Edmond, 531 U.S. at 43). 
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to life and limb‟ ” that would comply with the Edmond rule, the 
checkpoint violated the Fourth Amendment.98 
4.  Pursuance of Vehicles Avoiding Checkpoints 
The Appellate Division, Fourth Department, in People v. 
Chaffee,99 held that the police may pursue and stop vehicles seen to 
be avoiding roadblocks and checkpoints.100  In that case, patrol cars 
were stationed a short distance from a sobriety checkpoint to watch 
for vehicles making a sudden U-turn once they saw the checkpoint to 
subsequently pursue and stop such vehicles.101  The court held that 
when, “as an integral part of a sobriety checkpoint, the police have 
established a non-arbitrary uniform procedure to stop all motorists at 
the checkpoint or who reasonably appear to be avoiding the check-
point, we should give deference to the enforcement procedures estab-
lished by the police agency.”102  Further, “public policy weighs heavi-
ly in favor of upholding a non-arbitrary uniform procedure which 
prevents motorists from attempting to evade or avoid a DWI road-
block or checkpoint.”103 
5.  Checkpoints as Part of a Greater 
Programmatic Scheme 
In a decision broadening the Edmond primary purpose rule, 
the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, in People v. Trotter,104 
held that a checkpoint that by itself is permissible, can be rendered 
unconstitutional if it forms part of a greater programmatic scheme, 
which has a primary purpose that is impermissible when applied to a 
checkpoint.105  The checkpoint in question “was conducted as an 
integral component of the „Rochester Initiative. . . .‟ ”106  The purpose 
of the program “was to deter violent crimes and drug trafficking in an 
 
98 Id. at 71-72 (quoting Edmond, 531 U.S. at 43). 
99 590 N.Y.S.2d 625 (App. Div. 4th Dep‟t 1992). 
100 Id. at 627. 
101 Id. at 626. 
102 Id. at 627. 
103 Id. 
104 810 N.Y.S.2d 610 (App. Div. 4th Dep‟t 2006). 
105 Id. at 614. 
106 Id. at 610. 
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identified target area of Rochester. . . .”107  Even though the check-
point was operated as a routine highway safety-related checkpoint, 
the court held that the primary purpose is not determined by the par-
ticular manner in which it is being conducted, but rather by the un-
derlying reasons for which the police established it.108  As such, even 
though the checkpoint itself in isolation would be permissible, its in-
separability from the greater programmatic scheme, which has a gen-
eral crime control purpose, contravenes the Edmond rule, and thus 
violates the Fourth Amendment.109 
III.  COMPARISON AND SUMMARY OF THE LAW AS IT STANDS 
TODAY 
The New York rule governing the constitutionality of road-
blocks and vehicle checkpoints, established in Ingle, is an almost 
complete adoption of the federal Brown v. Texas rule.  The only real 
difference is that New York requires that all roadblocks be set up un-
der a uniform, non-discriminatory, and non-arbitrary program, which 
is not explicitly mandated under the federal rule, but can reasonably 
be implied from the Supreme Court‟s language in Brown v. Texas and 
Prouse.110  The constitutional provisions implicated are the same be-
tween the federal and State constitutions.111  A breach of one would 
automatically constitute a breach of the other as well, and, as such, 
roadblocks are typically only evaluated under the Fourth Amend-
ment. 
As it stands today, the law permits vehicle checkpoints to be 
established either at a permanent location,112 a non-permanent loca-
tion that may shift multiple times on the same night of operation,113 
or even roving checkpoints that stop every vehicle travelling on cer-
 
107 Id. 
108 Id. at 614. 
109 Trotter, 810 N.Y.S.2d at 614. 
110 Brown, 443 U.S. at 51; Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663. 
111 The Fourth Amendment states, in pertinent part: “The right of the people to be secure 
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated. . . .”  U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  The New York Constitution states, in 
pertinent part: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and ef-
fects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated. . . .”  N.Y. CONST. 
art. I § 12. 
112 Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 566. 
113 Scott, 473 N.E.2d at 5. 
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tain roads in a sparsely populated area.114  Checkpoints do not require 
individualized reasonable suspicion to stop vehicles passing through 
the checkpoint.115  Checkpoints may be operated for the purpose of 
intercepting illegal aliens,116 checking drivers‟ licensing and vehicle 
registration and inspection certification,117 to gather information re-
garding recent criminal activity on that road,118 as well as sobriety 
checkpoints to intercept drunken drivers.119  However, checkpoints 
may not be established with a primary purpose of general crime con-
trol or prevention.120  Furthermore, checkpoints, which, in isolation, 
are permissible can be rendered unconstitutional if they form part of a 
greater program or scheme that has general crime control as its pri-
mary purpose.121  Thus, vehicles seen deliberately avoiding check-
points may be pursued by the police, because the avoidance itself will 
give rise to reasonable suspicion.122 
IV.  CURRENT TRENDS IN THE USAGE OF VEHICLE 
CHECKPOINTS 
While checkpoints on the roads, be it general highway safety 
checkpoints or sobriety checkpoints, are certainly an annoyance to 
drivers due to the congestion they cause in heavily populated areas, 
no one can argue their effectiveness in promoting highway safety and 
combatting drunken driving.  For anybody living in a large metro-
politan area, checkpoints are a part of everyday life.  The fact that 
other violations, such as illegal narcotics or weapons possession, are 
often discovered as a result of a highway safety or sobriety check-
point furthers the public interest of having such checkpoints in heavi-
ly populated areas.  While studies have found that sobriety check-
points are not widely used due to a lack of police resources and 
community support, the areas where they are used certainly reap the 
 
114 John BB., 438 N.E.2d at 867. 
115 Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 562. 
116 Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 552, 566. 
117 Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663. 
118 Lidster, 540 U.S. at 428. 
119 Sitz, 496 U.S. at 455. 
120 Edmond, 531 U.S. at 42. 
121 Trotter, 810 N.Y.S.2d at 614. 
122 Chaffee, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 627. 
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benefits.123 
In modern times, especially in cities like New York that face 
the threat of terrorism, checkpoints are becoming an invaluable part 
of both law enforcement and terror prevention.  The Supreme Court 
suggested in Edmond, prior to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 
2001, that “the Fourth Amendment would almost certainly permit an 
appropriately tailored roadblock set up to thwart an imminent terror-
ist attack or to catch a dangerous criminal who is likely to flee by 
way of a particular route.”124  There can be no doubt that this remains 
true today, with checkpoints set up around bridges, tunnels, and other 
places considered probable targets in and around New York City on 
almost every holiday, practically bringing traffic to a halt. 
While public opposition to checkpoints may be greater in oth-
er areas, the same certainly cannot be said of residents of New York 
City and the surrounding areas, who tolerate a much greater and 
much more frequent intrusion on freedom of movement, especially 
on such holidays.125  Whether this same tolerance also applies to so-
briety checkpoints is a separate question, but given their widespread 
use, it is reasonable to determine that the general public has grown to 
accept it as a part of life.  Either way, sobriety checkpoints have been 
upheld by the Supreme Court and have been found to be effective, 








123 See Lidster, 540 U.S. at 426 (citing James C. Fell, Susan A. Ferguson, Allan F. Wil-
liams & Michele Fields, Why Aren’t Sobriety Checkpoints Widely Adopted As An Enforce-
ment Strategy In The United States?, 35 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 896, 899 (Nov. 
2003)). 
124 Edmond, 531 U.S. at 44. 
125 Al Baker, Sweeping Security Effort Planned for 9/11 Events, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 
2011, at A17. 
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